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Issues with SPEs & CPARS 






• 2015: 2.2M SPEs were either conducted, in-process, or 
required to be conducted (i.e., overdue) 
• SPE: “the process of evaluating, measuring, and 
monitoring supplier performance and suppliers’ business 
processes and practices for the purposes of reducing costs, 
mitigating risk, and driving continuous improvement” 
(Gordon, 2008, p. 4). 
• CPARS:  2 purposes: 
1. Inform source selection decisions of the likelihood that a 
prospective supplier will successfully perform the 
contract (FASA, 1994)  Future 







• Not timely 
• Not accurate 
• Lack sufficient information to support ratings  
• Omit rating for some performance areas 
• Inflated ratings 
 
If PPI is not reliable, and if buyers and evaluators do not (or cannot) 
use the information to discriminate between competitive proposals 
(Kelman, 2010), the effort of collecting, reporting, suppliers’ selling, and 
buyers evaluating PPI is wasted.   
• Non-trivial transaction costs (man-hours) to generate SPEs 
• Supplier ranking validity 
• Multiple raters invites dissonance in SPEs 
 
Purpose:  
• We do not know the extent to which SPEs validly build the buyer’s 
confidence in its assessment of the risk of doing business with a 
particular supplier ex ante.  




1. What factors decrease the efficacy of SPEs? 
2. How do suppliers react to inaccurate SPEs?  
3. Do SPEs, in general, motivate suppliers to increase 
performance? 
4. How does the accuracy of SPEs affect relationship quality?  
5. Why are SPEs often inaccurate?   
6. How many man-hours do suppliers invest in responding to 
SPEs? 
7. What communication tactics do suppliers use to manage the 
SPE process?  
8. To what extent does inter-rater disagreement (i.e., dissonance) 
affect SPE efficacy? 
 






• Economics of Information theory 
• Corporate Reputation theory 
• Agency theory 
• Organizational Behavior 
• Transaction Cost Analysis 
• Social Exchange theory 
• Channel communication theory 
• Power/dependence 
 
• Prior qualitative study 
Methodology 





1 What factors decrease the efficacy of SPEs? B & S Qt & Ql 
2 How do suppliers react to inaccurate SPEs? S Ql 
3 Do SPEs, in general, motivate suppliers to increase performance? S 
Ql 
4 How does the accuracy of SPEs affect relationship quality?  B & S 
Qt & Ql 
5 Why are SPEs often inaccurate? B & S Qt & Ql 
6 How many man-hours do suppliers invest in responding to SPEs? S 
Ql 
7 What communication tactics do suppliers use to manage the SPE process? S 
Ql 





• Interviewed 8 Suppliers  
• Explored effects of SPEs on suppliers 
Quantitative 
• Online Survey 
• Sample: 
• 131 performance assessors, U.S. military  
• PMs, KOs, Egrs, Log, QA 
• x ̅ exp = 14.75 yrs 
• Contracts: $62K - $10B 
• Services; Construction; Supplies/spares; Weapons 
• 36 FSCs/PSCs  
• Even split of SB & LB 
• RR = 5.2% 






• Overall, SPEs are perceived as somewhat accurate (x̄ = 
5.57 / 7) 
• Overall, SPEs are perceived as somewhat effective at 
mitigating adverse selection (x̄ = 5.47 / 7) 






RQ1 - What factors decrease 
the efficacy of SPEs? 
 
RQ2 - How do suppliers 
react to inaccurate SPEs? 
• Buyers neutral as to whether SPEs motivate supplier 
performance  
• Suppliers were mixed 
 
RQ3 - Do SPEs motivate 
suppliers to incr perf? 
• Inaccurate SPE ruined one relationship = lost supplier (lower 
competition) 
• Strained relationship; deteriorated trust 
• Buyer survey corroborates:  direct, positive effect 
 
RQ4 - How does SPE 
accuracy affect rel qlty? 
• Buyers:  insufficiently-defined requirement has the greatest 
impact 
• Suppliers corroborated & added:  differences in expectations  
• Buyers: Buyer unfairness (supplier received rating other than that 
deserved) 
• Buyers:  Leverage attitude 
• Suppliers corroborated the effect of leverage, reporting a 
hidden agenda in some SPEs 
• Buyers:  lack of communication formality and communication bi-
directionality  
• Buyers:  some inflated ratings 
• Suppliers:  infrequent performance evaluations 
• Suppliers:  recency of SPE to performance 
• Suppliers:  inconsistency and subjectivity  
• Suppliers:  evaluator turnover, technical knowledge, & CPAR 
training   
RQ5 - Why are SPEs 
often inaccurate? 
• Suppliers:  15-800 hours (mean 202, median 80)  
• Buyers:  0.5 – 100 hours (mean 18.1, median 8) 
 
• SPEs consume a day of effort by buyers to conduct the SPE 
and two weeks by suppliers to react to them.  
 
• SPEs will require the full effort of 26,512 FTEs &  
cost $3B annually.  
• Assuming: (1) a consistent number of SPEs annually, (2) a rate of 
pay of government evaluators and contractor employees 
equivalent to a GS-13, step 5, (3) a fringe benefit rate of 36.25% 
(OMB, 2008), (4) that 19% of SPEs will be rebutted, (4) that 
contractors spend 2 hours on non-rebutted SPEs and 80 hours on 
rebutted SPE, and (5) that buyers spend 8 hours on each SPE – 
each as found in this research (medians) 
RQ6 - How much time do 
suppliers spend on SPEs? 
• Supplier providing quarterly inputs of performance to the 
government customer 
• Supplier provides the customer a draft SPE report prior 
to the end of the period of performance  
• Supplier ensure that the self-assessment is coordinated 
with all of the customer’s functional performance 
assessors at the lowest level 
• Supplier increased qty & frequency of communication  
• Supplier increasing documentation (to rebut) 
• No supplier mentioned SPEs as part of the post-award 
orientation agenda. 
 
RQ7 - What communication 
tactics used by suppliers?  
• Rating dissonance decreases SPE efficacy, but not very 
strongly 
RQ8 - Does rater dissonance 
affect SPE efficacy? 
• Given high transaction costs of SPEs, would expect higher 
accuracy and stronger evidence of efficacy  
• SPE accuracy and rating justification are critical 
• Inaccuracy = more disputed SPEs  
• Future buyers have to believe the SPE to mitigate risk 
• Suppliers have to believe the SPE before altering perf 
• Rating dissonance weakly decreases SPE efficacy 
• May be attributed to a lack of a common meaning of 
performance criteria and of rating definitions 
• Buyer-supplier relationships matter (satisfaction; trust) 
• Poor relationship = more disputed SPEs 
• Communication matters (formality; bi-directionality) 
• Insufficient rqmts definition is a culprit 
Implications 
Assessing Officials’ Issues Needing 
Attention 
• Variance in SPE quality allowed by process and 
system – despite recent focus on improving 
weaknesses 
• Infuse more automation into the SPE IT system 
•i.e., reduce the amount of effort required to 
produce a sufficiently justified rating 
• Infuse more discipline into rqmts definition: 
• More clear link between levels of performance 
and performance ratings (sets expectations, 
reduces dissonance, reduces transaction costs) 
• Develop SPE quality index and periodically audit  
  
Implications 
• 37%, suppliers wrote their own SPEs (48 cases)  
• non-independently-derived performance information 
is suspect 
• supplier marketing material 
• billable to customer on non-FP contracts? 
• Halo effect confirmed (i.e., rating inflation)  
• Attributed to a fear of supplier dispute.  
• 25 respondents (19%) reported that someone on the 
buyer team either changed or influenced a change to 
the SPE 
• Evaluators and reviewing officials increase ratings 
to: (1) avoid conflict, (2) protect a program, (3) 
preserve the supplier relationship, (4) gain leverage 
over the supplier, and (4) avoid harming a supplier’s 
future business opportunities.  
Implications 
• Some ok with use of SPE rating as leverage—
either (or both) as a threat to a supplier during 
performance and prior to a SPE or as a means to 
extract concessions post hoc from a supplier in 
exchange for a more favorable SPE rating.  
• few respondents acted on those beliefs 
• unintended uses of SPEs as leverage should 
be explicitly addressed in training and policy 
• Suppliers questioned the utility and accuracy of 
SPEs that are conducted at a parent-contract level 
(e.g., IDIQ) versus a task-order level. 
• Lose fidelity of data to inform future SS.  Why 
allow it?  
• Limit assessor turnover (61/131, 46.5%, avg 2.9x)  
• Limit assessor work overload 
Implications 
• Why does the government restrict the purpose of 
its SPE system (i.e., CPARS) to informing future 
source selections?   
• Is it worthwhile to integrate past performance with 
a system to manage contractor performance during 
the contract (versus after contract performance, or 
once per year)?  




• Low Response Rate 
• Future Research 
• Confirmation study 
• Survey suppliers & test propositions 
• Quasi-experiments of commercial SPM systems vs. 
CPARS 
• Conclusions 
• Sky is not falling, but resources are consumed 
• Improvements are possible, and this study shows 
where to look 
 
  
Conclusion 
